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Abstract
We consider the game-theoretic scenario of testing the performance of Fore-
caster by Sceptic who gambles against the forecasts. Sceptic’s current capital
is interpreted as the amount of evidence he has found against Forecaster. Re-
porting the maximum of Sceptic’s capital so far exaggerates the evidence. We
characterize the set of all increasing functions that remove the exaggeration.
This result can be used for insuring against loss of evidence.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Calibrating exaggerated evidence 2
3 Insuring against loss of evidence 5
References 7
1 Introduction
In game-theoretic probability (see, e.g., [5]) Sceptic is trying to prove Forecaster
wrong by gambling against him: the values of Sceptic’s capital Kn measure the
changing evidence against Forecaster. It is always assumed that Sceptic’s initial
capital is K0 = 1, and Sceptic is required to ensure that Kn ≥ 0 at each time n.
The evidence, however, can be both gained and lost. When Kn becomes
large at some time n, Forecaster’s performance begins to look poor, but then Ki
for some later time i may be lower and make Forecaster look better. Our result
will show that Sceptic can avoid losing too much evidence, with a modest price
to pay for this.
Suppose we exaggerate the evidence against Forecaster by considering not
the current value Kn of his capital but the greatest value so far:
K∗n := max
i≤n
Ki.
Continuing research started in [4], we show that there are many functions F :
[1,∞) → [0,∞) such that: (1) F (y) → ∞ as y → ∞ almost as fast as y; (2)
Sceptic’s moves can be modified on-line in such a way that the modified moves
lead to capital
K′n ≥ F (K∗n), n = 1, 2, . . . . (1)
Sceptic who is worried about losing evidence can use a middle approach securing
him capital cKn + (1− c)K′n at each time n for a constant c ∈ (0, 1). This way
he may sacrifice a fraction 1− c of his capital but gets insurance against losing
the bulk of his evidence. See Section 3 for details.
Technically, we characterize the set of increasing functions F for which (1)
can be achieved. In [4] a similar result is proved in the framework of measure-
theoretic probability. The latter corresponds to the case where Sceptic’s strategy
is known in advance (it involves some other simplifying assumptions, such as
additivity and even σ-additivity, but they are less important in our current
context). The situation when Sceptic’s strategy is known is much easier, and [4]
uses a simple method based on Le´vy’s zero-one law (see [6] for the game-theoretic
version of Le´vy’s law). The method of this article is completely different and
is based on the idea of stopping and combining capital processes. This idea
is known and has been used in, e.g., [2] (Theorem 1, based on Leonid Levin’s
personal communication) and [5] (Lemma 3.1); we show that it gives optimal
results in our current framework.
In this article the words such as “positive” and “increasing” will be used in
the wide sense of the inequalities ≤ and ≥. The set of real numbers is R and
the set of natural numbers is N := {1, 2, . . .}. The extended real line [−∞,∞] is
denoted R, and we use the convention ∞+ (−∞) :=∞. If E is some property,
I{E} is defined to be 1 if E is satisfied and 0 if not.
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2 Calibrating exaggerated evidence
Our prediction protocol involves four players: Forecaster, Sceptic, Rival Sceptic,
and Reality.
Protocol 1 Competitive scepticism
K0 := 1 and K′0 := 1
for n = 1, 2, . . . do
Forecaster announces En ∈ E
Sceptic announces fn ∈ [0,∞]X such that En(fn) ≤ Kn−1
Rival Sceptic announces f ′n ∈ [0,∞]X such that En(f ′n) ≤ K′n−1
Reality announces xn ∈ X
Kn := fn(xn) and K′n := f ′n(xn)
end for
The parameter of the protocol is a set X , from which Reality chooses her moves;
E is the set of all “outer probability contents” on X (to be defined momentarily).
We always assume that X contains at least two distinct elements. The reader
who is not interested in the most general statement of our result can interpret
E as the set of all expectation functionals E : f 7→ ∫ fdP , P being a probability
measure on a fixed σ-algebra on X ; in this case Sceptic and Rival Sceptic are
required to output functions that are measurable w.r. to that σ-algebra.
In general, an outer probability content on X is a function E : RX → R
(where RX is the set of all functions f : X → R) that satisfies the following four
axioms:
1. If f, g ∈ RX and f ≤ g, then E(f) ≤ E(g).
2. If f ∈ RX and c ∈ (0,∞), then E(cf) = cE(f).
3. If f, g ∈ RX , then E(f + g) ≤ E(f) + E(g).
4. For each c ∈ R, E(c) = c, where the c in parentheses is the function in RX
that is identically equal to c.
An axiom of σ-subadditivity on [0,∞]X is sometimes added to this list, but we
do not need it in this article. (And it is surprising how rarely it is needed in
general: see, e.g., [6].) In our terminology we follow [3] and [6]. Upper previsions
studied in the theory of imprecise probabilities (see, e.g., [1]) are closely related
to (but somewhat more restrictive than) outer probability contents.
Protocol 1 describes a perfect-information game in which Sceptic tries to
discredit the outer probability contents En issued by Forecaster as a faithful
description of how Reality produces xn ∈ X . The players make their moves
sequentially in the indicated order. At each step Sceptic and Rival Sceptic
choose gambles fn and f
′
n on how xn is going to come out, and their resulting
capitals are Kn and K′n, respectively. Discarding capital is allowed, but Sceptic
and Rival Sceptic are required to ensure that Kn ≥ 0 and K′n ≥ 0, respectively;
this is achieved by requiring that fn and f
′
n should be positive.
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Let us call an increasing function F : [1,∞) → [0,∞) a capital calibrator if
there exists a strategy for Rival Sceptic that guarantees K′n ≥ F (K∗n) for all n,
with F (∞) understood to be limy→∞ F (y). We say that a capital calibrator F
dominates a capital calibrator G if F (y) ≥ G(y) for all y ∈ [1,∞). We say that
F strictly dominates G if F dominates G and F (y) > G(y) for some y ∈ [1,∞).
A capital calibrator is admissible if it is not strictly dominated by any other
capital calibrator.
Theorem 1. 1. An increasing function F : [1,∞) → [0,∞) is a capital
calibrator if and only if ∫ ∞
1
F (y)
y2
dy ≤ 1. (2)
2. Any capital calibrator is dominated by an admissible capital calibrator.
3. A capital calibrator is admissible if and only if it is right-continuous and∫ ∞
1
F (y)
y2
dy = 1. (3)
Proof. First we prove that any increasing function F : [1,∞)→ [0,∞) satisfying
F (y) =
∫
[1,y]
uP (du), ∀y ∈ [1,∞), (4)
for a probability measure P on [1,∞) is a capital calibrator. For each u ≥ 1,
define the following strategy for Rival Sceptic: at step n, the strategy outputs
f (u)n :=
{
fn if K∗n−1 < u
u otherwise
as Rival Sceptic’s move f ′n. Let us check that this is a valid strategy, i.e., that
En(f (u)n ) ≤ K(u)n−1, n ∈ N, where K(u) is defined by K(u)0 := 1 and K(u)n :=
f
(u)
n (xn) for n ∈ N. There are three cases to consider:
1. If K∗n−1 < u, we have K(u)n−1 = Kn−1 and En(f (u)n ) = En(fn) ≤ Kn−1 =
K(u)n−1.
2. If n is the smallest number for which K∗n−1 ≥ u, we have K(u)n−1 = Kn−1 ≥ u
and En(f (u)n ) = En(u) = u ≤ K(u)n−1.
3. Otherwise, we have K(u)n−1 = u and so En(f (u)n ) = En(u) = u = K(u)n−1.
Set f ′n(x) :=
∫
[1,∞) f
(u)
n (x)P (du), x ∈ X ; this gives K′n =
∫
[1,∞)K
(u)
n P (du) when
we set x to xn. Let us check that this is a valid strategy for Rival Sceptic, i.e.,
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that En(f ′n) ≤ K′n−1 for all n ∈ N. This is now obvious if En are expectation
functionals, and in general we have
En(f ′n) = En
(∫
[1,∞)
f (u)n P (du)
)
= En
(∫
[1,∞)
(
I{K∗n−1<u} fn + I{K∗n−1≥u} u
)
P (du)
)
= En
(
P ((K∗n−1,∞))fn +
∫
[1,K∗n−1]
uP (du)
)
≤ P ((K∗n−1,∞))Kn−1 +
∫
[1,K∗n−1]
uP (du)
=
∫
(K∗n−1,∞)
Kn−1P (du) +
∫
(K∗n−2,K∗n−1]
uP (du) +
∫
[1,K∗n−2]
uP (du)
≤
∫
(K∗n−1,∞)
K(u)n−1P (du) +
∫
(K∗n−2,K∗n−1]
K(u)n−1P (du) +
∫
[1,K∗n−2]
K(u)n−1P (du)
=
∫
[1,∞)
K(u)n−1P (du) = K′n−1.
The last inequality used the analysis of the three cases above. For small values
of n, our convention was K∗0 := 1 and K∗−1 := 1. Notice that our argument
only used Axioms 2–4 for outer probability contents; no σ-subadditivity was
required. This strategy will guarantee
K′n =
∫
[1,∞)
K(u)n P (du) ≥
∫
[1,K∗n]
K(u)n P (du) ≥
∫
[1,K∗n]
uP (du) = F (K∗n). (5)
We can now finish the proof of the statement “if” in part 1 of the theorem,
which says that any increasing function F : [1,∞) → [0,∞) satisfying (2) is a
capital calibrator. Without loss of generality we can assume that F is right-
continuous and that (3) holds. It remains to apply Lemma 1 below.
Let us now check that every capital calibrator satisfies (2). Suppose a capital
calibrator F violates (2). We can decrease F so that, for some a > 1 and N ∈ N,
it is constant in each interval [an−1, an), n = 1, . . . , N , is zero in [aN ,∞), and
still violates (2). Of course, F is still a capital calibrator. The substitution
x = 1/y shows that
∫ 1
0
F (1/x)dx > 1, which can be rewritten as
F (1)
(
1− 1
a
)
+ F (a)
(
1
a
− 1
a2
)
+ · · ·+ F (aN−1)
(
1
aN−1
− 1
aN
)
> 1. (6)
Suppose, without loss of generality, that X ⊇ {0, 1}, and let Forecaster always
choose
En(f) := 1
a
f(1) +
(
1− 1
a
)
f(0), n ∈ N.
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Let Sceptic play the strategy of always betting all his capital on 1: fn(1) :=
aKn−1 and fn(x) := 0 for x 6= 1. Then K∗N = an where n is the number of 1s
output by Reality before the first element different from 1 (except that n = N
if Reality outputs only 1s during the first N steps). Backward induction shows
that the initial capital K′0 required to ensure K′N ≥ F (K∗N ) must be at least
F (aN )
(
1
a
)N
+ F (aN−1)
(
1
a
)N−1(
1− 1
a
)
+ F (aN−2)
(
1
a
)N−2(
1− 1
a
)
+ · · ·+ F (a) 1
a
(
1− 1
a
)
+ F (1)
(
1− 1
a
)
> 1;
the inequality follows from (6), but we know that it is false as K′0 = 1.
We have proved part 1 of the theorem. Part 3 is now obvious, and part 2
follows from parts 1 and 3.
The following lemma was used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. An increasing right-continuous function F : [1,∞) → [0,∞) satis-
fies (3) if and only if (4) holds for some probability measure P on [1,∞).
Proof. Let us first check that the existence of a probability measure P satisfy-
ing (4) implies (3). We have:∫
[1,∞)
F (y)
y2
dy =
∫
[1,∞)
∫
[1,y]
u
y2
P (du)dy
=
∫
[1,∞)
∫
[u,∞)
u
y2
dyP (du) =
∫
[1,∞)
P (du) = 1. (7)
It remains to check that any increasing right-continuous F : [1,∞)→ [0,∞)
satisfying (3) satisfies (4) for some probability measure P on [1,∞). Let Q be
the measure on [1,∞) (σ-finite but not necessarily a probability measure) with
distribution function F , in the sense that Q([1, y]) = F (y) for all y ∈ [1,∞).
Set P (du) := (1/u)Q(du). We then have (4), and the calculation (7) shows that
the σ-finite measure P must be a probability measure (were it not, we would
not have an equality in (3)).
According to (3), the functions
F (y) := αy1−α (8)
are admissible capital calibrators for any α ∈ (0, 1).
3 Insuring against loss of evidence
As we saw in Section 1, there is a simple way to use Theorem 1 for insuring
against loss of evidence. The following corollary says that it leads to an optimal
result.
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Corollary 1. Let c ≥ 0 and F : [1,∞) → [0,∞) be an increasing function.
Rival Sceptic has a strategy ensuring
K′n ≥ cKn + F (K∗n) (9)
if and only if c and F satisfy∫ ∞
1
F (y)
y2
dy ≤ 1− c. (10)
Proof. Suppose (10) is satisfied; in particular, c ∈ [0, 1]. Using cfn+(1−c)f ′n as
Rival Sceptic’s strategy, where fn are Sceptic’s moves and f
′
n are Rival Sceptic’s
moves guaranteeing K′n ≥ 11−cF (K∗n) (cf. Theorem 1), we can see that Rival
Sceptic can guarantee (9).
Now suppose Rival Sceptic can ensure (9), but (10) is violated. As in the
proof of Theorem 1, we can decrease F so that, for some a > 1 and N ∈ N, it is
constant in each interval [an−1, an), n = 1, . . . , N , is zero in [aN ,∞), and still
violates (10). Similarly to (6), we have
F (1)
(
1− 1
a
)
+ F (a)
(
1
a
− 1
a2
)
+ · · ·+ F (aN−1)
(
1
aN−1
− 1
aN
)
> 1− c.
Suppose X ⊇ {0, 1} and define Forecaster’s and Sceptic’s strategies as before.
Now backward induction shows that the initial capital K′0 required to ensure
K′N ≥ cKN + F (K∗N ) must be at least
caN
(
1
a
)N
+ F (aN )
(
1
a
)N
+ F (aN−1)
(
1
a
)N−1(
1− 1
a
)
+ F (aN−2)
(
1
a
)N−2(
1− 1
a
)
+ · · ·+ F (a) 1
a
(
1− 1
a
)
+ F (1)
(
1− 1
a
)
> c+ (1− c) = 1.
This contradicts K′0 = 1.
According to (8) and (9), Rival Sceptic can guarantee
K′n ≥ cKn + (1− c)α(K∗n)1−α (11)
for any constants c ∈ [0, 1] and α ∈ (0, 1).
Corollary 1 does not mean that (11) or, more generally, (9) cannot be im-
proved; it only says that the improvement will not be significant enough to
decrease the coefficient in front of Kn. For example, if we do not discard the
term
∫
(K∗n,∞)K
(u)
n P (du) in (5), we will obtain
K′n ≥ P ((K∗n,∞))Kn + F (K∗n). (12)
The coefficient P ((K∗n,∞)) in front of Kn tends to zero as K∗n →∞.
In particular, using (12) allows us to improve (11) to
K′n ≥ cKn + (1− c)(1− α)(K∗n)−αKn + (1− c)α(K∗n)1−α.
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